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October 18, 1949

Society for the Prevention of
World War III,
515 Madison Avenue,
New York City

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your report titled "List of Americans who were instrumental in Scuttling the Allied Policy towards Germany." I still find this report inadequate for the following reasons:

(1) In many cases the biographical detail is far too scanty.

(2) Some of the people most instrumental in shaping our German policy are still not included in the list, such as Edward H. Litchfield, Clay's Principal Advisor, Civil Administration, James K. Pollack, Clay's Political Advisor, Lawrence Wilkinson, Clay's Advisor on Economic Affairs, Philip Hawkins, Decartelization, Robert D. Murphy, Dodge, Chief of Finance, Colonels Pillsbury and Bronson, I. G. Farben Control Office, Major Petroff, General Motors Attorney on Bell's Staff, Major General Adcock, Head of Public Safety Division and Colonel Joseph Starnes formerly with the Dies Committee.

Forgive my presumption, but it seems to me, that, as a layman I could have dictated three-fourths of the report out of my head. What I need is detailed and accurate information. It may well be that I did not make my request clear. I should like to restate it in the hope that it will aid further research in the field.

Whether Clay be "good" or "bad", it is obvious that he relied on a staff of persons for background information and advice. As Clark says in his new book, not all the information Clay received was accurate nor the advice sound. The thesis I am trying to prove is that the information given Clay was inaccurate because the men giving it were inadequate and untrained; and that the advice was unsound because the most influential men in military government were either grinding axes, motivated by special interest, or could not by virtue of previous associations, be objective. For example, Clark mentions the fact that the labor unions in Western Germany were the nearest